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Abstract 
The Ali (2013, EB) findings on the nexuses among institutions, finance and investment could 
have an important influence on policy and academic debates. This paper relaxes his 
hypotheses on the conception, definition and measurement of finance and institutions because 
they are less realistic to developing countries to which the resulting policy implications are 
destined. We dissect with great acuteness the contextual underpinnings of financial 
development dynamics and elucidate why the Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) justification 
provided for the measurement of property rights institutions (PRI) is lacking in substance. 
Using updated data (1996-2010) from 53 African countries, we provide more robust evidence 
on the substitution of institutions and finance in investment. Results under many baseline and 
augmented scenarios are not consistent with the underlying paper. Justifications for the 
differences in findings are discussed. As a policy implication, the Ali (2013, EB) findings for 
countries with poor financial systems may not be relevant for Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
 This note is in response to Ali (2013, EB) on the substitution of finance and 
institutions in prospects of private investment.  We relax his hypotheses on the conception, 
definition and measurement of finance and institutions because they are less realistic to 
developing countries to which the resulting policy implications are destined. Indeed the paper 
concludes that the findings are more relevant to developing countries which inherently have 
poor financial systems:  “This note presents evidence which shows that PRI and FD promote 
private investment in developing countries. More importantly, the analysis indicates that the 
impact of PRI on investment varies with the level of financial sector development, such that a 
strong PRI increase private investment especially in countries where the financial system is 
either missing or inadequate. On the contrary, well-functioning financial systems do not seem 
to increase the beneficial effect of property rights on investment. We postulate that this is so 
because well-functioning institutions can perform similar functions to sophisticated financial 
systems including the reduction of information and transaction costs and thereby enhance 
private investment in the absence of well developed financial sectors” (Ali, 2013, p. 1129). 
 In light of the above, we discuss four main shortcomings in the underlying paper with 
respect to developing countries: absence of an inherent nexus between the financial 
development measurement and private investment; context of the conception and 
measurement of financial development dynamics in developing countries; periodicity for 
relevance of policy implications and; measurement of property rights institutions (PRI).  
 First, we argue that contrary to Ali (2013), the intuition on a potential nexus between 
financial development and private investment should not be based on financial system 
deposits. Accordingly, deposits must be transformed into credit for economic operators in 
order to be materialized into private investments. The financial systems of developing 
countries are substantially suffering from surplus liquidity (deposit) issues. The excess 
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liquidity concerns in African financial systems have been substantially documented in recent 
financial development literature (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2011; 2012a; 
2013a,b,c; 2014a,b).  In light of the above, the nexus between deposits and private investment 
as provided by Ali (2013) may hypothetically not support his conclusions in African countries 
where deposits cannot easily be transformed into credit for economic operators.  
 Second, because the financial system maybe inadequate in developing countries (as 
per the conclusion of Ali), a great chunk of the monetary base may not transit through the 
formal financial system as deposits. Hence, using only financial system deposits to appreciate 
the levels of financial development in less developed countries inherently presents variable 
omission issues. We address this concern by employing all the dimensions identified by the 
Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank (WB). These 
include: financial depth (at overall economic and financial system levels); financial efficiency 
(from banking system and financial system perspectives), financial activity (at banking 
system and financial system levels) and financial size. In essence, the ‘substitution of finance 
and institutions in investment’ could be in the perspectives of financial dynamics of depth, 
allocation efficiency, activity and size.  
 Third, the intuition of using an updated dataset is threefold.  (1) The 1970 to 1999 
period used by Ali (2013) may not be the best periodicity to capture ‘property rights 
institutions’ (PRI) in developing countries. We argue that PRI were for the most part imposed 
on developing countries during second generation reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions 
(Asongu, 2014c; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010). Hence, consistent with recent openness literature 
(Asongu, 2013bde), a 1996-2010 sample period is more appropriate
2
. (2) The use of an 
                                                 
2
 In the 1980s and 1990s, most developing countries embarked on a plethora of policy initiatives at financial and 
institutional levels with the objective of given impetus to economic prosperity through financial allocation 
efficiency and investment opportunities (Janine & Elbadawi, 1992). First generation reforms entailed inter alia, 
the following policies: allowing of interests rates to be market determined; relaxing of control on international 
capital movements; abolishing explicit control on the pricing and allocation of credit; relaxing of control on 
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updated dataset provides findings with more updated and focused policy implications. (3) The 
use of five-year data averages by the underlying study also presents one main shortcoming: 
post 1990 second generation institutional and financial reforms are captured only by two 
periods. 
 Fourth, the use of Polity IV to appreciate PRI is somehow lacking in substance. While 
Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) are used by the author to justify the choice, we argue that the 
indicator is only limited to political governance. Consistent with recent property rights 
literature (Andrés & Asongu, 2013, p. 671-672), PRI entail a plethora of governance 
mechanisms. Therefore, we complement Polity IV with a composite indicator of political 
(political stability and voice & accountability), economic (government effectiveness and 
regulation quality) and institutional (rule of law and corruption-control) governance.  
 Drawing from the above, the present note assesses the three main hypotheses of Ali 
(2013). 
Hypothesis 1: The incidence of finance on private investment is positively significant. 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of PRI on private investment is also positively significant. 
Hypothesis 3: The interaction of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 on private investment is 
negative implying that the positive effects are stronger in countries with poorer and/or 
inadequate financial systems.  
 The rest of the note is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and outlines 
the methodology. Empirical results and discussion are covered in Section 3. Section 4 
concludes with policy recommendations.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
international capital movements and; reducing direct government intervention in bank credit decisions. On the 
other hand, reforms of the second generation focused on institutional and structural constraints, among others:  
 improvement of the regulatory, supervisory, legal and institutional environments; restoration of bank soundness 
and; rehabilitation of financial infrastructure (Batuo et al., 2010; Asongu, 2013bd). 
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2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
We examine a sample of 53 African countries with annual data from African 
Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) and the Financial Development and 
Structure Database (FDSD) for the period 1996 to 2010. Limitations to the scope of countries 
and periodicity of analysis have a threefold justification. First, the African continent for the 
most part consists of poor countries with inadequate financial systems. Hence, this positioning 
is consistent with the hypotheses from the findings of Ali (2013). Second, constraints in data 
availability on institutional quality, since government quality indicators of the WB only date 
from 1996. Third, the motivation of capturing second generation reforms (which targeted 
institutional constraints) for more focused and updated policy implications.  
 
2.1.1 Private investment and financial development dynamics 
 Consistent with Ali (2013) we measure private investment as a proportion of GDP. In 
addition to financial depth, we extend the underlying study by presenting the ‘substitution of 
finance and institutions in investment’ in financial perspectives of allocation efficiency, 
activity and size. Moreover, we complement the existing measurement of financial system 
depth (deposits) with overall economic depth (money supply) that integrates the informal 
financial sector.  
 Firstly, from a financial depth perspective we appreciate financial depth both from 
overall-economic and financial system dimensions with indicators of broad money supply 
(M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. The monetary base (M0) plus 
demand, saving and time deposits constitute the former whereas liquid liabilities (or deposits) 
make-up the latter.  
 Secondly, in line with underpinnings discussed in the introduction, financial efficiency 
measures the ability of deposits (money) to be transformed into credit for private investment 
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purposes. This second indicator appreciates the fundamental mission of financial institutions 
in transforming mobilized deposits into credit for private investment. We account for both 
banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-efficiency (respectively ‘bank credit on bank 
deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on financial system deposits: Fcfd’).  
 Thirdly, financial activity is measured in terms of credit. This further emphasizes the 
ability of banks to grant credit for private investment purposes. We proxy for both for 
financial-system-activity and banking-system-activity with “private credit by deposit banks 
and other financial institutions: Pcrbof” and “private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb” 
respectively. 
 Fourthly, financial system size is measured in terms of deposit bank assets (credit) as a 
proportion of total assets (deposit bank assets plus central bank assets). The correlation 
analyses  presented in Appendix 2 show that (but for financial size) the two indicators adopted 
for each financial dynamic can be used to robustly check the other, owing to their high 
degrees of substitution (correlation). 
2.1.2 Property rights institutions (PRI) and control variables 
 The baseline PRI is the Polity IV as employed by Ali (2013) and justified with 
Acemoglu & Johnson (2005). We complement this indicator of political governance with 
other indicators of political, economic and institutional governance. The institutional index 
derived is the first principal component of political (political stability and voice & 
accountability), economic (government effectiveness and regulation quality) and institutional 
(rule of law and corruption-control) governance. Details of this composition are presented in 
Section 2.2.1 below.  
 In order to ensure consistency, the control variables are broadly in line with Ali 
(2013). Trade openness, inflation and economic prosperity are used in the conditioning 
information set. We expect economic prosperity and trade openness to increase private 
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investment whereas inflation should mitigate it. This is essentially because trade and 
economic prosperity come with growth and investment opportunities. On the other hand, 
inflation creates uncertainties in returns to investment that could ultimately discourage private 
investment prospects.  
 The summary statistics, correlation analysis and variables are detailed in the 
appendices. Appendix 1 on the summary statistics shows that the variables employed in the 
panel regressions have quite some degree of variation such that one should be comfortable 
and confident that reasonable estimated nexuses would emerge. The purpose of the correlation 
analyses in Appendix 2 is to mitigate the potential issues of overparametization and 
multicollinearity in the financial development dynamics. The definition of the variables and 
corresponding sources are presented in Appendix 3.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Principal Component Analysis  
 In line with Asongu (2013b), due to the high degree of substitution (correlation) 
among various governance variables, there is redundancy of some information. Therefore we 
use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensions of political, economic and 
institutional governance. PCA is a widely used statistical method to reduce a larger set of 
correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called principal component 
(PC) that reflect most of the  information in the original dataset. Hence, the objective is to 
reduce six governance indicators (government-effectiveness, political stability, corruption-
control, rule of law, regulation quality, and voice & accountability) into a single variable. 
In the decision of which PC to retain for common factors, the criteria used is from Kaiser 
(1974) and Jolliffe (2002). They advise that only PCs with an eigenvalue greater than one 
should be selected. As presented in Table 1 below, the first PC is appropriate since it has an 
eigenvalue of 4.642 and summarizes more than 77% of information in the combined 
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institutional indicators. Hence, the retained first PC will represent our institutional index 
(Instidex).  
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Institutional Index (Instidex) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 V & A R.L R.Q G.E PS CC    
First  P.C 0.383 0.443 0.403 0.429 0.374 0.413 0.773 0.773 4.642 
Second  P.C 0.297 -0.021 -0.369 -0.350 0.774 -0.230 0.077 0.851 0.466 
Third P.C 0.750 -0.223 0.353 -0.127 -0.300 -0.396 0.066 0.917 0.398 
P.C: Principal Component. V& A: Voice & Accountability. R.L: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. 
 
 
2.2.2 Estimation Technique  
 To ensure consistency, the estimation strategy is the same as in Ali (2013). 
Accordingly, when compared with other cross-country analysis, dynamic panel data 
estimation has many advantages (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008; Asongu, 2013b). The 
dynamic panel regression model in first difference is presented as follows: 
 
)()()()( 1,,41,,31,,22,1,11,,   titititititititititi FPRIFPRIPRIPRIFFPIPIPIPI                     
)()()()()( 1,,11,,71,,61,,5   tititttitititititi IIEETT        (1) 
 
Where ‘t’ represents the period and ‘i’ stands for a country. PI  is private investment; F , 
financial development (depth, efficiency, activity or size); PRI , property rights institutions 
(Polity IV or Institutional index); FPRI , interaction between finance (F) and property rights 
institutions (PRI); T , trade openness; E , economic prosperity; I , inflation; i  is a country-
specific effect;  t  is a time-specific constant and;  ti ,  an error term. Between the system 
GMM estimation (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) and the difference GMM 
estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991), we go for the former with respect to Bond et al. (2001, 
pp. 3-4). In the specification of the estimations, the two-step GMM approach is preferred to 
the one-step approach because it corrects for heteroscedasticity. We use three year non-
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overlapping intervals to mitigate short-run disturbances and control for the issue of instrument 
proliferation in GMM estimations. Hence, the basic condition for using GMM estimation is 
met: N>T (53>5). Moreover, the instruments are substantially lower than the number of cross-
sections.  
In summary, the principal arguments for dynamic system GMM estimation are that it: 
controls for the potential endogeneity in all the regressors, mitigates potential biases of the 
difference estimator in small samples and, does not eliminate cross-country variation 
(Asongu, 2013f).  
 
3. Empirical analysis and discussion of results 
 This section assesses three main issues: (1) the incidence of financial dynamics and 
institutions on private investment; (2) the substitution of financial dynamics and institutions in 
private investment and; (3) the validity of (1) and (2) when an institutional index (Instidex) is 
used in place of Polity IV in the measurement of PRI. While Section 3.1 deals with the first-
two concerns (Tables 2-3), the third issue is assessed in Section 3.2 (Tables 4-5). The validity 
of the models by means of the Sargan OIR and AR(2) tests are broadly confirmed since their 
null hypotheses are not overwhelmingly rejected
3
.  
 
3.1 Updated financial dynamics and baseline PRI measurement  
 Tables 2-3 below assess the Ali (2013) hypotheses using financial dynamics and the 
baseline PRI measurement (Polity IV). While Table 2 reports financial dynamics of depth and 
efficiency, Table 3 is concerned with financial dynamics of activity and size. Panel A(B) of 
                                                 
3
 To examine the validity of the model, we have performed two tests, notably the Arellano and Bond test for 
autocorrelation which investigates the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and the Sargan-test which examines 
the over-identification restrictions. The latter test investigates if instruments are uncorrelated with the error term 
in the equation of interest. The null hypothesis of this test is the stance that the instruments as a group are strictly 
exogenous (that is, they do not suffer from endogeneity). We only report AR(2) in difference because it is more 
relevant than the AR(1). Overwhelmingly for almost all estimated models, we are neither able to reject the 
AR(2) null hypothesis for the absence of autocorrelation  nor the Sargan null for the validity of the instruments.  
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Table 2 report’s findings of financial depth (efficiency) whereas Panel A(B) of Table 3 shows 
results of financial activity (size).  
 But for the positive effect of financial size on private investment in Panel B of Table 
3, the Ali (2013) hypotheses are overwhelmingly rejected under the assumption of financial 
dynamics with the baseline PRI measurement. In essence, the following could be established. 
(1) All the financial dynamics and PRI estimates have the expected signs. (2) Neither PRI (as 
measured by Polity IV) nor financial dynamics (of depth, efficiency and activity) improve 
private investment. (3) Financial size has a positive incidence on private investment. (4) The 
interaction between financial dynamics and PRI do not significantly augment the dependent 
variable. (5) The significant control variables have the expected signs:  trade (inflation) has a 
positive (negative) impact on the private investment. 
  
 
Table 2: Financial depth and financial efficiency  
         
 Panel A: Financial Depth, Institutions and Private investment 
 Money Supply (M2) Liquid Liabilities (Fdgdp) 
         
Private Investment(-1) 0.150 0.464** 0.221 0.221 0.150 0.456** 0.215 0.215 
 (0.552) (0.044) (0.595) (0.595) (0.552) (0.036) (0.577) (0.577) 
Constant  6.139*** 4.744** 5.414*** 5.414*** 6.139*** 4.964*** 5.628*** 5.628*** 
 (0.001) (0.020) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Growth  0.515* 0.282* 0.432 0.432 0.515* 0.270 0.423 0.423 
 (0.055) (0.096) (0.339) (0.339) (0.055) (0.102) (0.303) (0.303) 
Inflation -0.0008*** -0.034*** -0.031 -0.031 -0.0008*** -0.037*** -0.034* -0.034* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.104) (0.104) (0.000) (0.000) (0.077) (0.077) 
Trade  0.030 0.011 0.034 0.034 0.030 0.0122 0.033 0.033 
 (0.369) (0.689) (0.547) (0.547) (0.369) (0.666) (0.517) (0.517) 
PRI (Polity IV) 0.060 --- -0.001 -0.001 0.060 --- -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.661)  (0.991) (0.991) (0.661)  (0.916) (0.916) 
Financial Depth (M2) --- 3.570 4.160 --- --- 4.349 --- --- 
  (0.294) (0.310)   (0.229)   
Liquid Liabilities(Fdgdp) --- --- --- --- --- --- 5.080 --- 
       (0.181)  
PRI*M2 --- --- --- -1.386 --- --- --- --- 
    (0.310)     
PRI*Fdgdp --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -1.693 
        (0.181) 
         
Time effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.383 0.729 0.519 0.519 0.383 0.727 0.491 0.491 
 (0.701) (0.465) (0.603) (0.603) (0.701) (0.466) (0.622) (0.622) 
Sargan OIR 11.480 9.302 11.591 11.591 11.480 9.437 11.013 11.013 
 (0.175) (0.317) (0.170) (0.170) (0.175) (0.306) (0.200) (0.200) 
Wald  (joint) 211.59*** 38.86*** 39.21*** 39.21*** 211.59*** 36.542*** 39.57*** 39.57*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries 44 41 39 39 44 42 39 39 
Instruments  14 17 18 18 14 17 18 18 
Observations  155 141 133 133 155 142 134 134 
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 Panel B: Financial Efficiency, Institutions and Private investment 
 Banking System Efficiency (BcBd) Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 
         
Private Investment(-1) 0.150 0.345 0.129 0.129 0.150 0.356 0.028 0.028 
 (0.552) (0.118) (0.616) (0.616) (0.552) (0.255) (0.956) (0.956) 
Constant 6.139*** 3.700* 4.299 4.299 6.139*** 5.437** 5.321** 5.321** 
 (0.001) (0.063) (0.158) (0.158) (0.001) (0.012) (0.031) (0.031) 
Growth  0.515* 0.417** 0.554 0.554* 0.515* 0.324 0.595 0.595 
 (0.055) (0.014) (0.083) (0.083) (0.055) (0.130) (0.314) (0.314) 
Inflation -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.039*** -0.033 -0.033 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.190) (0.190) 
Trade  0.030 0.026 0.032 0.032 0.030 0.030 0.064 0.064 
 (0.369) (0.146) (0.409) (0.409) (0.369) (0.345) (0.196) (0.196) 
PRI (Polity IV) 0.060 --- 0.008 0.008 0.060 --- 0.007 0.007 
 (0.661)  (0.963) (0.963) (0.661)  (0.966) (0.966) 
B. Sys.  Efficiency(BcBd) --- 1.506 2.824 --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.367) (0.292)      
F. Sys. Efficiency(FcFd) --- --- --- --- --- 0.065 0.506 --- 
      (0.923) (0.758)  
PRI*BcBd --- --- --- -0.941 --- --- --- --- 
    (0.292)     
PRI*FcFd --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.168 
        (0.758) 
         
Time Effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.383 0.797 0.639 0.639 0.383 0.728 0.149 0.149 
 (0.701) (0.425) (0.522) (0.522) (0.701) (0.466) (0.881) (0.881) 
Sargan OIR 11.480 6.724 10.343 10.343 11.480 6.381 12.317 12.317 
 (0.175) (0.566) (0.241) (0.241) (0.175) (0.604) (0.137) (0.137) 
Wald  (joint) 211.59*** 136.32*** 187.59*** 187.59*** 211.59*** 105.09*** 34.665*** 34.66*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  44 45 43 43 44 41 39 39 
Instruments  14 17 18 18 14 17 18 18 
Observations  155 159 151 151 155 137 129 129 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. M2: Money Supply (Overall Economic Depth). Fdgdp: liquid liabilities (Financial System Depth). BcBd: Bank credit on 
bank deposit (Banking System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial credit on financial deposit (Financial System Efficiency). PRI: Property Rights 
Institutions. B. Sys: Banking System. F. Sys: Financial System. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
 
  
Table 3: Financial activity and financial size 
         
 Panel A: Financial Activity, Institutions and Private investment 
 Banking System Activity (Pcrb) Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 
         
Private Investment(-1) 0.150 0.441** 0.215 0.215 0.150 0.412** 0.172 0.172 
 (0.552) (0.019) (0.574) (0.574) (0.552) (0.022) (0.664) (0.664) 
Constant 6.139*** 4.672** 5.663*** 5.663*** 6.139*** 5.135*** 6.013*** 6.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.012) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Growth  0.515* 0.312* 0.413 0.413 0.515* 0.330* 0.454 0.454 
 (0.055) (0.068) (0.330) (0.330) (0.055) (0.070) (0.295) (0.295) 
Inflation -0.0008*** -0.037*** -0.034* -0.034* -0.0008*** -0.040*** -0.038** -0.038** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.071) (0.071) (0.000) (0.002) (0.046) (0.046) 
Trade  0.030 0.017 0.036 0.036 0.030 0.022 0.043 0.043 
 (0.369) (0.495) (0.443) (0.443) (0.369) (0.376) (0.389) (0.389) 
PRI (Polity IV) 0.060 --- -0.040 -0.040 0.060 --- -0.038 -0.038 
 (0.661)  (0.812) (0.812) (0.661)  (0.831) (0.831) 
B. Sys.  Activity (Pcrb) --- 5.251 5.562 --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.180) (0.151)      
F. Sys. Activity (Pcrbof) --- --- --- --- --- 1.877 2.577 --- 
      (0.502) (0.311)  
PRI*Pcrb --- --- --- -1.854 --- --- --- --- 
    (0.151)     
PRI*Pcrbof --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.859 
        (0.311) 
         
Time Effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.383 0.712 0.485 0.485 0.383 0.697 0.403 0.403 
13 
 
 (0.701) (0.476) (0.627) (0.627) (0.701) (0.485) (0.686) (0.686) 
Sargan OIR 11.480 8.704 10.691 10.691 11.480 9.036 10.779 10.779 
 (0.175) (0.367) (0.219) (0.219) (0.175) (0.339) (0.214) (0.214) 
Wald  (joint) 211.59*** 40.877*** 37.02*** 37.02*** 211.59*** 39.86*** 34.22*** 34.22*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  44 41 39 39 44 41 39 39 
Instruments  14 17 18 18 14 17 18 18 
Observations  155 142 134 134 155 142 134 134 
         
 Panel B: Financial Size, Institutions and Private investment 
 Financial Size (Dbacba) 
         
Private Investment(-1) 0.150 0.350 0.251 0.251     
 (0.552) (0.172) (0.332) (0.332)     
Constant  6.139*** 1.941 4.926* 4.926*     
 (0.001) (0.434) (0.057) (0.057)     
Growth  0.515* 0.351* 0.388 0.388     
 (0.055) (0.059) (0.177) (0.177)     
Inflation -0.0008*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006***     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Trade  0.030 0.010 -0.007 -0.007     
 (0.369) (0.495) (0.768) (0.768)     
PRI (Polity IV) 0.060 --- 0.170 0.170     
 (0.661)  (0.267) (0.267)     
Financial Size (Dbacba) --- 5.655*** 3.791 ---     
  (0.005) (0.225)      
PRI*Dbacba --- --- --- -1.263     
    (0.225)     
         
Time Effects   Yes  Yes Yes Yes     
AR(2) 0.383 0.663 0.653 0.653     
 (0.701) (0.507) (0.513) (0.513)     
Sargan OIR 11.480 7.649 9.017 9.017     
 (0.175) (0.468) (0.340) (0.340)     
Wald  (joint) 211.59*** 127.72*** 192.20*** 192.20***     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Countries  44 45 43 43     
Instruments  14 17 18 18     
Observations  155 157 149 149     
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks (Banking System Activity). Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks 
and other financial institutions (Financial System Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on deposit bank assets plus central bank assets 
(Financial Size). PRI: Property Rights Institutions. B. Sys: Banking System. F. Sys: Financial System. The significance of bold values is 
twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
 
 
3.2 Updated financial dynamics and modified PRI measurement  
 Tables 4-5 below assess the third issue outlined in the introduction of Section 3. 
Accordingly, the three hypotheses of the introduction are examined using financial 
development dynamics and a modified PRI measurement (institutional index). Whereas Table 
4 reports financial dynamics of depth and efficiency, Table 5 is concerned with financial 
dynamics of activity and size. Panel A(B) of Table 4 report’s findings of financial depth 
(efficiency) whereas Panel A(B) of Table 5 shows results of financial activity (size).  
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 One similarity and one difference emerge from the second scenario. The former is a 
positive effect of financial size on private investment in Panel B of Table 5 while in the latter 
PRI (as measured by the institutional index) now has a positive effect on the dependent 
variable. Hence, the new measurement of PRI is found to have an appealing incidence on 
private investment. But for the above exceptions, the Ali (2013) hypotheses are still 
overwhelmingly rejected under the scenario of financial dynamics with modified PRI 
measurement.  
 In summary, the following could be established. (1) The financial dynamics and PRI 
estimates have the expected signs. (2) While PRI as measured by Instidex has a positive effect 
on the dependent variable, financial dynamics (of depth, efficiency and activity) do not 
improve private investment. (3) Financial size has a positive incidence on private investment. 
(4) The interaction between financial dynamics and PRI do not significantly augment the 
dependent variable. (5) The significant control variables have the expected signs:  trade 
(inflation) has a positive (negative) impact on the private investment. 
 
Table 4: Financial depth and financial efficiency  
         
 Panel A: Financial Depth, Institutions and Private investment 
 Money Supply (M2) Liquid Liabilities (Fdgdp) 
         
Private Investment(-1) 0.401* 0.464** 0.471** 0.471** 0.401* 0.456** 0.460*** 0.460*** 
 (0.051) (0.044) (0.020) (0.020) (0.051) (0.036) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant  5.231*** 4.744** 5.017** 5.017** 5.231*** 4.964*** 5.186*** 5.186*** 
 (0.002) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.002) (0.000) (0.006) (0.006) 
Growth  0.326* 0.282* 0.284* 0.284* 0.326* 0.270 0.292* 0.292* 
 (0.056) (0.096) (0.072) (0.072) (0.056) (0.102) (0.065) (0.065) 
Inflation -0.0006*** -0.034*** -0.025* -0.025* -0.0006*** -0.037*** -0.027** -0.027** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.044) (0.044) 
Trade  0.009 0.011 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.0122 0.006 0.006 
 (0.642) (0.689) (0.838) (0.838) (0.642) (0.666) (0.799) (0.799) 
Institutional index (Instidex) 0.711*** --- 0.527* 0.527* 0.711*** --- 0.497 0.497 
 (0.000)  (0.081) (0.081) (0.000)  (0.125) (0.125) 
Money Supply (M2) --- 3.570 2.025 --- --- 4.349 --- --- 
  (0.294) (0.553)   (0.229)   
Liquid Liabilities (Fdgdp) --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.433 --- 
       (0.516)  
Instidex*M2 --- --- --- -1.088 --- --- --- --- 
    (0.553)     
Instidex*Fdgdp --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -1.307 
        (0.516) 
         
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.799 0.729 0.766 0.766 0.799 0.727 0.739 0.739 
 (0.424) (0.465) (0.443) (0.443) (0.424) (0.466) (0.459) (0.459) 
Sargan OIR 8.038 9.302 8.889 8.889 8.038 9.437 9.526 9.526 
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 (0.429) (0.317) (0.351) (0.351) (0.429) (0.306) (0.299) (0.299) 
Wald  (joint) 231.78*** 38.86*** 63.92*** 63.92*** 231.78*** 36.542*** 63.537*** 63.537*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  46 41 41 41 46 42 41 41 
Instruments  17 17 18 18 17 17 18 18 
Observations  162 141 140 140 162 142 141 141 
         
 Panel B: Financial Efficiency, Institutions and Private investment 
 Banking System Efficiency (BcBd) Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 
         
Private Investment(-1) 0.401* 0.345 0.379* 0.379* 0.401* 0.356 0.376* 0.376* 
 (0.051) (0.118) (0.063) (0.063) (0.051) (0.255) (0.098) (0.098) 
Constant  5.231*** 3.700* 4.890** 4.890** 5.231*** 5.437** 6.382*** 6.382*** 
 (0.002) (0.063) (0.021) (0.021) (0.002) (0.012) (0.000) (0.008) 
Growth  0.326* 0.417** 0.341* 0.341* 0.326* 0.324 0.349* 0.349* 
 (0.056) (0.014) (0.059) (0.059) (0.056) (0.130) (0.060) (0.060) 
Inflation -0.0006*** -0.0008*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.039*** -0.023* -0.023* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.060) 
Trade  0.009 0.026 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.030 0.012 0.012 
 (0.642) (0.146) (0.594) (0.594) (0.642) (0.345) (0.506) (0.506) 
Institutional index (Instidex) 0.711*** --- 0.678*** 0.678*** 0.711*** --- 0.710** 0.710** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)  (0.024) (0.024) 
B. Sys.  Efficiency (BcBd) --- 1.506 0.753 --- --- ---  --- 
  (0.367) (0.629)      
F. Sys. Efficiency (FcFd) --- --- --- --- --- 0.065 -0.790 --- 
      (0.923) (0.409)  
Instidex*BcBd --- --- --- -0.404 --- ---  --- 
    (0.629)     
Instidex*FcFd --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.424 
        (0.409) 
         
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.799 0.797 0.828 0.828 0.799 0.728 0.731 0.731 
 (0.424) (0.425) (0.407) (0.407) (0.424) (0.466) (0.464) (0.464) 
Sargan OIR 8.038 6.724 8.093 8.093 8.038 6.381 6.724 6.724 
 (0.429) (0.566) (0.424) (0.424) (0.429) (0.604) (0.566) (0.566) 
Wald  (joint) 231.78*** 136.32*** 261.10*** 261.10*** 231.78*** 105.09*** 103.36*** 103.36*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  46 45 45 45 46 41 41 41 
Instruments  17 17 18 18 17 17 18 18 
Observations  162 159 158 158 162 137 136 136 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. M2: Money Supply (Overall Economic Depth). Fdgdp: liquid liabilities (Financial System Depth). BcBd: Bank credit on 
bank deposit (Banking System Efficiency). FcFd: Financial credit on financial deposit (Financial System Efficiency). B. Sys: Banking 
System. F. Sys: Financial System. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald 
statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the 
Sargan OIR test.  
 
Table 5: Financial activity and financial size 
         
 Panel A: Financial Activity, Institutions and Private investment 
 Banking System Activity (Pcrb) Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 
         
Private Investment(-1) 0.401* 0.441** 0.441*** 0.441*** 0.401* 0.412** 0.422*** 0.422*** 
 (0.051) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.051) (0.022) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant  5.231*** 4.672** 5.155** 5.155** 5.231*** 5.135*** 5.584*** 5.584*** 
 (0.002) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
Growth  0.326* 0.312* 0.332* 0.332* 0.326* 0.330* 0.343* 0.343* 
 (0.056) (0.068) (0.061) (0.061) (0.056) (0.070) (0.062) (0.062) 
Inflation -0.0006*** -0.037*** -0.027* -0.027* -0.0006*** -0.040*** -0.027* -0.027* 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.054) (0.054) (0.000) (0.002) (0.069) (0.069) 
Trade  0.009 0.017 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.022 0.010 0.010 
 (0.642) (0.495) (0.669) (0.669) (0.642) (0.376) (0.607) (0.607) 
Institutional index (Instidex) 0.711*** --- 0.509 0.509 0.711*** --- 0.636* 0.636* 
 (0.000)  (0.152) (0.152) (0.000)  (0.072) (0.072) 
B. Sys.  Activity (Pcrb) --- 5.251 2.586 --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.180) (0.566)      
F. Sys. Activity (Pcrbof) --- --- --- --- --- 1.877 -0.271 --- 
      (0.502) (0.913)  
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Instidex*Pcrb --- --- --- -1.389 --- --- --- --- 
    (0.566)     
Instidex*Pcrbof --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.145 
        (0.913) 
         
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.799 0.712 0.713 0.713 0.799 0.697 0.714 0.714 
 (0.424) (0.476) (0.475) (0.475) (0.424) (0.485) (0.475) (0.475) 
Sargan OIR 8.038 8.704 9.060 9.060 8.038 9.036 9.178 9.178 
 (0.429) (0.367) (0.337) (0.337) (0.429) (0.339) (0.327) (0.327) 
Wald  (joint) 231.78*** 40.877*** 66.348*** 66.348*** 231.78*** 39.86*** 71.20*** 71.20*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  46 41 41 41 46 41 41 41 
Instruments  17 17 18 18 17 17 18 18 
Observations  162 142 141 141 162 142 141 141 
         
 Panel B: Financial Size, Institutions and Private investment 
 Financial Size (Dbacba) 
         
Private Investment(-1) 0.401* 0.350 0.413* 0.413*     
 (0.051) (0.172) (0.057) (0.057)     
Constant  5.231*** 1.941 4.947 4.947     
 (0.002) (0.434) (0.127) (0.127)     
Growth  0.326* 0.351* 0.282 0.282     
 (0.056) (0.059) (0.137) (0.137)     
Inflation -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006***     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Trade  0.009 0.010 -0.002* -0.002     
 (0.642) (0.495) (0.898) (0.898)     
Institutional index (Instidex) 0.711*** --- 0.679* 0.679*     
 (0.000)  (0.060) (0.060)     
Financial Size (Dbacba) --- 5.655*** 1.420 ---     
  (0.005) (0.705)      
Instidex*Dbacba --- --- --- -0.763     
    (0.705)     
         
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes     
AR(2) 0.799 0.663 0.708 0.708     
 (0.424) (0.507) (0.478) (0.478)     
Sargan OIR 8.038 7.649 8.737 8.737     
 (0.429) (0.468) (0.364) (0.364)     
Wald  (joint) 231.78*** 127.72*** 263.93*** 263.93***     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Countries  46 45 45 45     
Instruments  17 17 18 18     
Observations  162 157 156 156     
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks (Banking System Activity). Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks 
and other financial institutions (Financial System Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on deposit bank assets plus central bank assets 
(Financial Size). B. Sys: Banking System. F. Sys: Financial System. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of 
estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
 
We briefly discuss the differences in results with respect to tested hypotheses in three main 
strands: the nexus between financial dynamics and private investment (Hypothesis 1); the 
relationship between Polity IV and private investment (Hypothesis 2) and; the relevance of the 
interaction effect (Hypothesis 3).  
 First, on Hypothesis 1 the overwhelming absence of positive nexuses among financial 
dynamics (depth, efficiency and activity) and private investment could be explained by the 
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substantially documented surplus liquidity issues in African financial institutions (Saxegaard, 
2006; Fouda, 2009). Financial allocation efficiency could also be appreciated as the ratio of 
financial depth (deposits and/or money) to financial activity (credit for investment). Hence, 
the low allocation efficiency also implies low financial activity and high financial depth. On 
the other hand, the significant positive effect of financial size is not unexpected since it is 
broadly consistent with recent African finance literature. In comparison to financial dynamics 
of depth, activity and efficiency, financial size has been found to be the most significantly 
sensitive to economic activity (Asongu, 2013g, 2014a, b).  
 Second, Hypothesis 2 is only partially valid. PRI as measured by Polity IV 
(Institutional index) insignificantly (significantly) improve private investment. The 
insignificant effect of Polity IV has a twofold explanation: the time and level hypotheses for 
the benefits of democracy. In line with Asongu (2012b), the time and level hypotheses have 
been documented: in many countries in Africa (Lemarchand, 1972), Southeast Asia (Scott, 
1972), India (Wade, 1985) and Turkey (Sayari, 1977); post 1990 communist countries like 
Russia (Varsee, 1997) and: many Latin American countries upon different waves of 
democratization (Weyland, 1998). 
 Third, the findings of Hypothesis 3 on the interaction between Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2 have a fourfold inference. (1) The hypothesis is not overwhelming validated.  
(2) The underpinnings of the hypothesis are unfounded in the first scenario (Section 3.1) 
because: (i) PRI in terms of Polity IV independently have a lower insignificant effect on the 
dependent variable in comparison to financial dynamics and; (ii) the fact is confirmed by the 
lower effect of Polity IV when both PRI and financial dynamics are modeled in the same 
equation. (3) Under the second scenario (with usage of Instidex), the underpinnings of the Ali 
(2013) hypotheses may sound more plausible because: (i) the effects of PRI on private 
investment are overwhelmingly positively significant and; (ii) the incidence of financial 
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dynamics on the dependent variable are overwhelmingly positively insignificant. (4) In 
general terms, differences in the interaction effect could also be explained by the fact that the 
scope of the interaction effect as elucidated by Ali is one-sided. Accordingly, while “…strong 
property rights increase promote increased investment and that this positive effect is stronger 
in countries with poorer financial systems…” (Ali, 2013, p. 1), we postulate that the effect of 
the interaction could also be the other way round: strong financial institutions promoting 
increase investment with the positive effect stronger in countries with poor PRI.  
 
4. Conclusion and policy recommendations 
 The Ali (2013, EB) findings on the nexuses among institutions, finance and 
investment could have an important influence on policy and academic debates. This paper 
relaxes his hypotheses on the conception, definition and measurement of finance and 
institutions because they are less realistic to developing countries to which the resulting policy 
implications are destined. We dissect with great acuteness the contextual underpinnings of 
financial development dynamics and elucidate why the Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) 
justification provided for the measurement of property rights institutions (PRI) is lacking in 
substance. Using updated data (1996-2010) from 53 African countries, we provide more 
robust evidence on the substitution of institutions and finance in investment. Results under 
many baseline and augmented scenarios are not consistent with the underlying paper. 
Justifications for the differences in findings are discussed. As a policy implication: PRI 
should not be measured strictly from political governance; the context of financial 
development should be taken into account in the proxying of financial variables and; the Ali 
(2013) hypotheses for poor countries may  not be relevant for Africa. 
 While it is indisputable that institutions are crucial for Africa’s emergence (Fosu, 
2013ab), the measurement of PRI in terms of Polity IV has shortcomings. Whereas the 
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drawbacks on which the note is positioned have already been discussed, it is relevant 
nonetheless to highlight how Africa is different from other regions of the World in relation to 
Polity IV which was originally designed as a measurement of political system durability and 
in later years broadened in terms of analytical scope to entail issues of regime type. In North 
Africa, the 2011 Arab Spring has not completely subsided. In Egypt, the conception and 
definition of democracy has been revised several times. Tunisia’s transition is yet to fully 
produce the anticipated results because it is continuously being plagued by social disruptions 
and political assassinations. The law of the land of post-Gaddafi Libya is still substantially 
influenced by rebels who neither are willing to succumb to central government authority nor 
ready to disarm.  
 The situation of sub-Saharan Africa is no less unappealing as the case of South Sudan 
is continuously preoccupying the international community. Not to mention her sisterly Central 
African Republic neighbor with a present situation not much different from the past (the 
ripples of failed coup d’états that happened between 1996-2003 and the Bush War of 2004-
2007). Zimbabwe’s protracted politico-economic meltdown, the post-election crises of 
2007/2008 in Kenya and, Nigeria’s 2008 controversial transition accompanied by a growingly 
determined Boko Haram, inter alia, merit some mention. Political strife has been a rule of the 
democratic game in Africa:  Angola (1975-2002); Burundi (1993-2005); Chad (2005-2010); 
Sierra Leone (1991-2002);  Liberia (1999-2003); the Congo Democratic Republic; Sudan 
(with carnages in Durfur);  Somalia and Côte d’Ivoire (a resurrected crisis in 2011 after the 
1999 coup d’état and 2002-2007 civil war). In summary, seven of the nine cases of total chaos 
and societal breakdowns known in recent history have been registered in Africa (with the 
exceptions of Afghanistan and Syria): Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zaire/Congo, 
Somalia, and Sudan.  
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 Given that Polity IV is also an indicator for priority in political rights; the results go a 
long way to extending the debate of ‘the Washington Consensus versus the Beijing Model’ on 
precedence between ‘economic rights’ and ‘political rights’ (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014; 
Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013; Lalountas et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014d; Moyo, 2013). Though an 
endogeneity robust empirical strategy has been employed, in light of the on-going debate, we 
are tempted to infer that issues of reverse causality may still be at play. Hence, Polity IV 
(political rights) could be more endogenous to private investment (economic rights). It is also 
important to note that the policy recommendations are not blanket, as issues of heterogeneity 
in countries like Botswana and Mauritius may be apparent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
Private Investment (PI) 12.979 9.400 -2.437 112.35 658 
Polity IV(PRI) 0.521 5.196 -9.000 10.000 750 
Institutional Index (Instidex) 0.105 2.075 -5.399 5.233 598 
Overall economic depth : (M2) 0.317 0.229 0.001 1.279 564 
Financial system depth (Liquid liabilities) 0.251 0.214 0.001 1.054 567 
Banking system efficiency (BcBd) 0.699 0.338 0.133 2.304 706 
Financial system efficiency (FcFd) 0.755 0.423 0.137 2.606 567 
Banking system activity (Pcrb) 0.171 0.168 0.001 0.869 567 
Financial system activity (Pcrbof) 0.194 0.237 0.001 1.739 567 
Financial system size (Dbacba)  0.702 0.251 0.017 1.609 693 
Economic Prosperity (GDP grpwth) 4.763 7.293 -31.300 106.28 759 
Trade Openness  77.853 39.698 17.859 275.23 719 
Inflation 57.556 955.55 -100.00 24411 673 
Voice & Accountability (V& A) -0.674 0.734 -2.174 1.047 636 
Rule of Law -0.706 0.682 -2.691 1.053 633 
Regulation Quality  -0.687 0.674 -2.729 0.905 631 
Government Effectiveness -0.681 0.614 -1.853 0.807 598 
Political Stability (No voilence) -0.557 0.958 -3.311 1.143 636 
Corruption Control -0.607 0.623 -2.495 1.086 622 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  
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Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis  
              
Financial Development Dynamics Control variables Institutions Private  
Fin. Depth Fin. Efficiency Fin. Activity F.Size      Invest.  
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba GDP Trade Infl. PRI Instidex PI  
1.000 0.974 -0.081 -0.018 0.750 0.600 0.389 -0.130 0.225 -0.055 0.069 0.535 0.118 M2 
 1.000 -0.050 0.053 0.808 0.689 0.447 -0.101 0.250 -0.053 0.108 0.608 0.143 Fdgdp 
  1.000 0.870 0.379 0.377 0.298 -0.055 -0.082 -0.043 0.029 0.227 0.032 BcBd 
   1.000 0.509 0.640 0.267 -0.067 -0.149 -0.076 0.077 0.239 -0.033 FcFd 
    1.000 0.929 0.500 -0.099 0.074 -0.059 0.121 0.611 0.101 Pcrb 
     1.000 0.434 -0.092 0.027 -0.047 0.184 0.554 0.061 Pcrbof 
      1.000 -0.072 0.181 -0.051 0.146 0.508 0.194 Dbacba 
       1.000 0.125 -0.057 -0.032 0.033 0.372 GDP 
        1.000 0.022 -0.074 0.148 0.446 Trade 
         1.000 -0.040 -0.099 -0.042 Infl. 
          1.000 0.423 -0.011 PRI 
           1.000 0.216 Instidex 
            1.000 PI 
              
Fin(F): Financial. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposit. FcFd: Financial credit on financial 
deposit. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. 
Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on deposit bank assets plus central bank assets. GDP: GDP growth rate. Infl: Inflation. PRI: Property Rights 
Institutions. Instidex: Institutional Index. PI: Private Investment. Invest: Investment.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Definitions of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
Financial  system Depth  Money Supply (% of GDP) FDSD (World Bank) 
   
Banking System Depth  Liquid Liabilities (% of GDP) FDSD (World Bank) 
   
Banking System 
Efficiency  
Bank credit on Bank deposit FDSD (World Bank) 
   
Financial System 
Efficiency  
Financial credit on Financial deposit FDSD (World Bank) 
   
Banking System Activity  Private domestic credit by deposit banks (% of GDP) FDSD (World Bank) 
   
Financial System Activity  Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions (% of GDP) 
FDSD (World Bank) 
   
Financial System Size  Deposit bank assets on (Deposit bank assets plus Central 
bank assets) 
FDSD (World Bank) 
   
Economic Prosperity  GDP growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Trade  Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Inflation  Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Property Rights 
Institutions 
Polity Index: property rights institutions measured by 
‘constraint on the executive’ from the Polity IV index.  
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Institutional Index  First PC of V&A, RL, RQ, GE, PS and CC PCA 
   
Private Investment  Gross Private Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. PCA: Principal Component 
Analysis. P.C: Principal Component. V& A: Voice & Accountability. R.L: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government 
Effectiveness. PS: Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. 
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